KNOWING LAW'S LIMITS: COMMENTS ON "FORGIVENESS:
INTEGRAL TO CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS AND INIMICAL TO
JUSTICE?"
Kathryn Webb Bradley1
It is an honor and a privilege to have the opportunity to comment on
Professor Fincham's thought-provoking paper about the relationship of
forgiveness to our most important personal relationships and our
concepts of justice.
I want to emphasize at the outset that I agree with much of what
Professor Fincham has to say. It is certainly true that forgiveness is
integral to close relationships, at least relationships that are healthy and
nurturing. 2 Anyone who has maneuvered the complexities of an
interpersonal relationship-which is to say any of us-likely can attest
to the need for those in the relationship to seek and grant forgiveness
from and to each other.
Professor Fincham is also correct that there is nothing in the nature
3
of either forgiveness or justice that makes one inimical to the other. The
experiences of restorative justice in the criminal context and of apology
in medical malpractice litigation make this clear. Both movements
demonstrate that it is fully possible for an individual who has suffered a
criminal or tortious wrong at the hand of another to experience both
justice and forgiveness. 4 As Professor Fincham points out, and as the law
understands, forgiveness does not mean forsaking the right to
recompense. 5 Thus, an individual convicted of assault is punished,
regardless of whether the victim has forgiven the offender, and a
physician whose care is negligent must compensate even a forgiving
patient.
The issue becomes more complicated, however, once we enter the
realm of family law, particularly when we focus on the law relating to
the dissolution of marriage. This complexity stems from the nature of the
relationships involved, the nature of the conduct at issue, and the stated
expectations of the judicial system. In looking at these issues, I hope to
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draw from the two areas in which I teach: family law and legal ethics.
Although the concepts addressed here can apply to all family members
involved in a divorce, including children, I will focus particular attention
on the spouses who are the actual parties to the divorce proceeding. 6
First, the close family relationships at stake in a divorce case differ
in a significant way from the interpersonal relationships involved in a
typical criminal or tort case to which concepts of restorative justice are
currently being applied. While there are certainly far too many instances
in which a crime is perpetrated by one family member on another,7 in the
typical situation in which principles of restorative justice are employed
in the criminal justice setting, the victim and offender have no need or
reason to remain in contact following resolution of the court
proceedings. Likewise, in the medical malpractice context, even when a
longstanding doctor-patient relationship is involved, the relationship is a
professional, not personal, one. Terminating that relationship as a result
of the tort suit carries little risk of long-lasting emotional harm to either
doctor or patient.
In the family law context, on the other hand, the relationship in
question is the most personal and intimate one we know: that of husband
and wife. Moreover, the purpose of the court proceedings is not to
resolve the dispute between the two, but to dissolve the legal relationship
between them. Yet even as the legal relationship signifying the
emotional bond between the couple ends, the practical necessity of
interaction between the former spouses continues, particularly if there
are children involved whose custody and care are at issue.
Professor Fincham stresses that reconciliation between the parties is
not required following forgiveness. 8 Indeed, in some relationships, such
as abusive ones, reconciliation may be inappropriate. 9 As he also
emphasizes, however, forgiveness facilitates reconciliation.' 0 In the
divorce context, we do not expect full reconciliation between spouses,
Solangel Maldonado, Taking Account of Children s Emotions: Anger &
Forgiveness in "RenegotiatedFamilies," 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 443 (2009)
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which would eliminate the need for the judicial proceedings entirely.
Instead, the most we realistically hope for is a semi-reconciliation of
sorts, where the spouses repair the relationship sufficiently to be able to
interact without conflict in the future, even though not well enough to
continue the marriage.
The problem is that even this partial reconciliation cannot occur
without forgiveness. Yet in the divorce context, this partial reconciliation
may leave the forgiving spouse feeling less than satisfied. As Professor
Fincham notes, forgiveness requires significant effort.'" In a divorce, the
forgiving spouse may feel that he has expended significant effort with
little to show for it. This is particularly the case if the forgiving spouse
believes that the other spouse has not made reciprocal efforts to forgive
or to adequately express remorse for problems that occurred during the
marriage. The forgiving spouse may also feel dissatisfied if he has hoped
for a restoration of the marital relationship through full reconciliation but
the other spouse is resistant and continues to pursue divorce. When the
forgiving spouse was not the one to initiate divorce proceedings, then
following forgiveness, the forgiving spouse is left in a situation he does
not want, forging a life he did not imagine. It is not surprising, then, if at
least in the short-term, forgiveness may not seem worth the effort.
Research confirms what we all know from personal experience: the
ability to forgive depends, at least in part, on the emotional state of the
forgiver. Thus, a spouse who feels insecure is unlikely to forgive the
other spouse even on days when the other spouse is being warm and
supportive.1 2 Likewise, hurt feelings lead to anger, which inhibits the
ability to forgive. 13 Few situations are more likely to cause a spouse to
feel insecure and hurt than divorce, particularly when the other spouse
has initiated the separation. These feelings of anger and insecurity, no
matter how well-founded, are inimical to forgiveness.
Second, the conduct that must be forgiven in the dissolution context
differs in significant ways from the conduct at issue in the restorative
justice arena. In the criminal or tort context, no matter how grievous the
injury, the victim generally must focus on forgiving a single action or set
of actions on the part of the wrongdoer. 14 In divorce, on the other hand,
even if the dissolution is prompted by a cataclysmic event such as
11Id. (manuscript at 7).
12 Phillip R. Shaver et al., What's Love Got to Do with It? Insecurity and Anger
in Attachment Relationships, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 491 (2009) (manuscript
at 14, on file with author).
13 Mark Leary, Losing Perspective. Emotion, Ego,
and Overreactions to
Undesired Events, 16 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 425 (2009) (manuscript at 6-7, on
file with author).
14 Lazare, supra note 4, at 255 (describing types of harm
caused to patients in a
medical practice).
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adultery, each spouse is likely to perceive that the other has committed a
multitude of sins great and small during the course of the marriage.' 5 The
sheer volume of the accumulated wrongs may make forgiveness more
difficult. In Professor Fincham's terms, what is at issue is not a specific
hurt, but a "hurtful relationship," in which each new wrong triggers
memories of the old. 16 Furthermore, even when both spouses recognize
that the marriage is fatally flawed, the decision by one spouse to actually
seek divorce is likely to be perceived by the other as yet another injury
that itself requires forgiveness. If the spouse who has been left has
attempted to remain committed to the relationship throughout the
marriage and has worked to forgive the other's transgressions in the past,
the final betrayal through the other spouse's departure from the marriage
may be the last straw that makes further forgiveness impossible. 7
Third, while there is more at stake in terms of the relationships in
family law than in criminal or tort proceedings-or perhaps because
there is more at stake-our system of justice currently tries to
accomplish less in family law than in other contexts. In the criminal
justice system, there is an explicit understanding that because the
offender has caused harm to the victim, the victim and society are
entitled to redress. Likewise, in the tort context, the law recognizes that
an individual who has been harmed by the negligent or intentional act of
another is entitled to a legal remedy, most often in the form of monetary
compensation.' 8 Even in contract actions, where the relationship between
the parties is one of arms-length dealing, the law acknowledges the harm
caused by broken promises and awards monetary damages and equitable
relief for breach of those promises.
In each of these situations, the law promotes a key requirement for
forgiveness: the need for the victim to acknowledge that he has been
wronged and to demand the right to better treatment. 19 As Professor
Fincham points out, it is impossible for forgiveness to take place unless
the forgiver recognizes that he has suffered harm. z° While forgiveness
can occur without the wrongdoer acknowledging the harm she has
caused, acknowledgment by the wrongdoer or others aids the forgiveness
15 Fincham, supra note 2 (manuscript at 25); cf Maldonado, Taking Account,

supra note 6, (manuscript at 32-33) (regarding child forgiving a parent).
16 Fincham, supra note 2 (manuscript at 28).
17 Id. (manuscript at 28).
18 Lazare, supra note 4, at 260 (discussing monetary and nonmonetary
reparations to medical patients).
19 Fincham, supra note 2 (manuscript at 7). This discussion assumes that the law
functions as intended. If the legal system malfunctions, by not adequately
punishing a wrongdoer or compensating a victim, the victim may find it much
harder to forgive. In this situation, the initial injury is compounded by the
separate injury inflicted by the justice system itself.
20 Id. (manuscript at 3).
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process. 2 1 In the typical criminal, tort, or contract proceeding, the ability
of the law to demand recompense, however inadequate, facilitates
forgiveness for wrongs done, because there is public acknowledgment
through the justice system that one individual has suffered at the hands
of another. Moreover, because the law imposes penalties on or demands
compensation from the wrongdoer, the need for vengefulness on the part
of the victim is reduced. The victim therefore is likely to have at least
some sense that the law is attempting to achieve justice, even if its
efforts are inadequate. Thus, the relationship between forgiveness and
justice is certainly not an inimical one.
In the family law arena, however, the move toward no-fault divorce
aims to remove a spouse's wrongdoing from consideration entirely.
From the earliest days of divorce in this country until the 1960s, grounds
for divorce were based on fault. A spouse seeking a divorce had to
establish that the other spouse had committed a grievous injury that
warranted ending the marriage, such as adultery, desertion, or mental or
physical cruelty.2 2 Divorce proceedings in court required evidence
establishing the spouse's wrongful conduct, and the granting of a divorce
served as judicial recognition of harm caused by one spouse to the
other.23 Consideration of the behavior of one spouse toward another also
shaped the law relating to the award of spousal support, so that the
wrongdoing spouse was penalized financially for actions during the
24
marriage.
The rise of no-fault divorce that began four decades ago has aimed
to change this approach. Although many states still retain fault as a
consideration, particularly regarding issues relating to support and
custody, the model no-fault divorce laws on which numerous state
statutes are patterned seek to take blame out of the mix. 25 Thus, in a nofault divorce regime, neither spouse is viewed as a victim of the other.
The move toward no-fault divorce thereby strives to prevent spouses
from using the courtroom to attack each other as had been common in a

See id. (manuscript at 9).
22 See generally Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing
Hostility and Conflict after Divorce, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441, 459
[hereinafter CultivatingForgiveness].
23 Id. at 460-61.
24-1d at 461-62.
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fault-based regime.2 6 The current system allows a judge instead to focus
on what courts are believed to be most capable of deciding: property
valuation and equitable distribution, and assessment of the best interests
and needs of minor children.
This seemingly straightforward conceptual shift to no-fault divorce
is complicated by the dual nature of marriage. It is generally understood
that in the eyes of the law marriage both acknowledges a contract
between the parties and bestows a status on them. Marriage requires
consent of both spouses to a set of implicit and explicit obligations
assumed toward each other and any children of the marriage. At the
point the marriage is entered into, the state confers legal rights and
responsibilities on the marital partners.27
Under traditional approaches to divorce law, predating the move to
no-fault, courts focused on the marital contract and breach of the
promises that underlay it as a basis for deciding whether to grant a
divorce and impose spousal support obligations.2 8 This approach created
numerous problems. In a traditional contract case, the ability to reduce
an agreement to writing allows a court to invoke principles such as the
parol evidence rule and the "four corners" doctrine to establish
predictability in contract interpretation and eliminate the need for relying
on the parties' recollections. In the marital context, on the other hand,
agreements about how spouses will share parenting duties and make
career decisions for each spouse turn on the particular circumstances of
the relationship and thus vary widely. Reducing spousal contracts
regarding such multifarious understandings to writing is not only
cumbersome, but is discouraged by the law, which long has refused to
enforce agreements that attempt to regulate the day-to-day interaction of
the spouses. 29 This judicial reluctance to enforce marital contracts has
arisen partly because of our historical notions of what the marital
relationship means, and partly because of the divide that the law has
26
27

Maldonado, CultivatingForgiveness,supra note 22, at 459.
See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) ("Other contracts may be

modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the
parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and
holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities.").
28 In a number of states that still use fault as a factor in divorce, it is relevant
in
the context of spousal support. Support may be unavailable to a spouse who is
deemed to have breached the duties owed to the other spouse. Thus, for
example, an otherwise needy spouse who has committed adultery may be
ineligible to receive spousal support. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a).
29 See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 938 (D. Mich.1940) (refusing
to enforce contract specifying career and domicile decisions by couple). In
recent years, premarital and marital contracts that pertain strictly to property
ownership and division between the spouses have been held enforceable and are
not at issue here. See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3
(specifying issue with respect to which parties may contract).
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recognized between public and private life. 30 It also reflects an
understanding of the evidentiary difficulties posed by a divorce case.
Establishing a breach by one spouse of the promises made to the other
necessarily pits the recollections and testimony 'of one spouse against
another. The conflicting memories of the parties and the strong emotions
at issue make it difficult for a judge, even one very skilled in family law
matters, to discern the "truth," to the extent a single truth exists.
What the no-fault system does is abandon this effort entirely. The
effect of the move toward no-fault divorce has been to shift the emphasis
from the contractual nature of marriage to the status aspect of marriage.
No-fault divorce concentrates on altering the legal status of the spouses
by dissolving the marital partnership created by the state at the time of
the marriage. As with the dissolution of any partnership, the law
endeavors to allocate to each partner-here a spouse-an appropriate
share of the partnership's financial assets and of any ongoing partnership
obligations-which in the case of divorce can include not only debt
incurred during the marriage, but also custody and support obligations
that derive from the family relationship.3 1 In contrast to dissolution of a
business partnership, however, where courts routinely rely on written
32
agreements between the partners that allocate partner obligations, a
court applying no-fault divorce laws aims to treat both spouses as equal
partners in the marital relationship.
There is a persuasive argument that justice is better served by the
law's current approach, which focuses not on assessing blame in the
marriage, but on adjudicating the division of assets and future
responsibilities between the spouses, so that each is able to build a new,
productive life after divorce. Nevertheless, focusing on the parties' legal
status as spouses rather than on the agreements made between them
during the marriage has ramifications for their ability to forgive. In any
marriage the spouses share a host of understandings about how they will
conduct their marriage that depend on the particular circumstances of
their specific relationship, promises that are almost always broken
through the events leading to the dissolution of a marriage. Removing
Kathryn Abrams, Law and Emotion: Some Implications of a New Paradigm
for Family Law, 16 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 301 (2009) (manuscript at 8-16, on
file with author).
31 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (providing
for equitable
distribution of marital property); id. § 309 (permitting court to order one or both
30
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32 REVISED UNIFORM
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the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement").
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fault from the divorce determination means that a spouse who believes
he has suffered a breach of the marital contract is unlikely to receive any
acknowledgment from the judicial system that he has suffered harm, and
33
therefore he is deprived of the first step toward forgiveness.
Forgiveness is not inimical to justice in this setting. It is simply
irrelevant,at least from the point of view of the law.

What does this mean for the future of forgiveness and justice in
family law?
I am not suggesting a return to a fault-based system for divorce law.
The problems with such a system are many and well documented.
Among other things, basing resolution of a divorce proceeding on a
finding of fault encourages deception, vengefulness, and simple
meanness by the divorcing spouses that are themselves inimical to
justice. 34 While the goals of a no-fault system have not been fully
realized, the move away from a fault-based system is a step in the right
direction.
I am suggesting, however, that we need to acknowledge how little
the law can do. The law is perfectly capable of creating a workable
system for valuing assets and dividing them equitably. It may even be
capable of devising a means for assessing the best interests of a child,
although doing so fairly may require determination on the part of a judge
faced with divorcing spouses who insist on attacking each other's
parenting abilities.35 What the law cannot do with any degree of
accuracy is to successfully delve into the emotions and minutiae of the
average marriage and determine who is at fault.
Spouses are better served, therefore, if they lower their expectations
about what the law can accomplish in the context of divorce. Reasonable
expectations can be liberating. If a spouse fully understands that the
justice system has no mechanism for acknowledging, much less
remedying, the emotional and personal harm caused in marriage, he may
33
34
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be more willing both to grasp what the law can give and to look
elsewhere for resolution of the accompanying emotional issues,
including the need to forgive.
Achieving this understanding depends in large part on the effort of
lawyers as they counsel clients. The role of the lawyer as counselor has
recurred as a theme throughout this conference, and I cannot emphasize
strongly enough the importance of this role. The lawyer's ethical
obligations to confer with a client about the objectives of the
representation and communicate with how those objectives are to be
relationship. 36
achieved are fundamental to any attorney-client
Moreover, a lawyer is encouraged to draw on a wide range of
considerations beyond the law when counseling a client, something that
is particularly important in the emotionally fraught world of divorce.37
So what should a lawyer do to help a divorce client emerge from the
legal process ready to forgive a former spouse?
First, the lawyer needs to explain not just the letter of the law, but
the purposes behind the law. One significant problem, particularly in the
family law setting, is the tendency of a client to confuse what the lawthe justice system-can do with what the client believes is just-that is,
"Justice" with a capital "J." Understanding why the law is as it is may
help the client form reasonable expectations about what the law can
accomplish. The lawyer should explain that the law aims to remove
emotion from the process precisely because emotions are so volatile,
with the goal of finding a way to fairly divide assets and continuing
responsibilities in a way that allows all parties to move forward.
If the client understands the limits of the law, then-assuming the
law functions as it should-the client may be more likely to come away
from the experience with a sense that the process was fair and that
justice-to the extent the law can bestow it-was achieved. In addition,
if the client understands that the law cannot consider emotion in
resolving issues, the client may be more willing to keep emotion out of
the equation, or at least keep emotion in check. In this regard, a lawyer's

36

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (mandating that "a lawyer

shall abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of representation
and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued"), R. 1.4(a)(2) (mandating that a lawyer "promptly
consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be
accomplished").
37 Id. at R. 2.1 ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation.").
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modeling of polite, appropriate behavior toward opposing counsel and
38
the other spouse can be essential to helping the client do the same.
Second, the lawyer should make clear the process for achieving the
law's goals. Doing so will allow a client to understand how court
proceedings, mediation, or collaborative lawyering will proceed, and
what the result is likely to be. Encountering the legal system is difficult
for a non-lawyer in virtually any setting. In the area of family law in
particular, the conflict between the highly personal nature of the issues at
stake and the impersonal nature of the process can be frightening. The
fear and sense of lack of control induced by what is often an unfamiliar
and seemingly hostile process may further heighten the client's anger
and insecurity. These emotions in turn make forgiveness much more
difficult to undertake.
Recent developments in family law have made great strides in
smoothing the process for participants, through mechanisms such as
collaborative lawyering and court-ordered mediation. Although the
primary goal of these programs is to achieve a mutual and acceptable
resolution of issues relating to property, support, and custody, they often
have the added benefit of creating an atmosphere that may foster
forgiveness. The opportunity to meet in a setting less intimidating than a
courtroom and to work with the aid of professionals to reach acceptable
compromises may go a long way toward dissipating the animosity
between divorcing spouses. Nevertheless, the law cannot demand that
the spouses forgive each other, and that is not the aim of such
programs. 39 Moreover, given the private and deeply personal nature of
many of the wrongs that occur in marriage, it may be inappropriate to
provide the sort of public opportunity to seek and offer forgiveness that
now occurs in other contexts through restorative justice programs.
Thus, while reforming the divorce process may achieve greater
civility and cooperation between the parties, a client who expects
acknowledgment of the pain he has suffered in the marriage and
recompense for that pain may emerge from the process disappointed,
38

American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY:

GOALS FOR FAMILY LAWYERS § 1.3 (2000) ("An attorney should refuse to assist
in vindictive conduct and should strive to lower the emotional level of a family
dispute by treating all other participants with respect.").
39 For example, a typical collaborative lawyering agreement to which both
spouses and their lawyers are parties specifies that spouses "will try not to focus
on the problems that may have contributed to the breakdown of the marital
relationship but on the issues that need to be resolved for both [spouses] to
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existed" between the spouses. See Collaborative Participation Agreement, at §§
1 (d) ii,
9 (e) (on file with author).
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regardless of the financial outcome. In this regard, the devices used to
facilitate settlement in divorce differ significantly from those used in
restorative justice, which deliberately foster forgiveness through the
opportunity for apology and the acknowledgment that a wrong has
occurred.
For this reason, the lawyer also needs to counsel the client about
how to best achieve the client's long-term goals, looking beyond the
divorce proceedings toward how the client will build a new life.
Understanding the client's goals requires the lawyer to actively listen to
the client with attentiveness and empathy, something that should be the
aim in any attorney-client relationship. It is perfectly appropriate for the
lawyer to help start the client on the path toward forgiveness by
emphasizing its benefits of improved interpersonal relationships and
40
reduced emotional and physical stress.
Likewise, it is within the scope of the lawyer's role as counselor to
alert the client to the risk that an emotional overreaction to what is
occurring in the divorce proceedings may impair the client's ability to
make reasoned decisions. 4 1 A client whose judgment is clouded by anger
and a desire for retribution is likely to make demands in the divorce
proceedings that may serve the client's short-term interests in seeking
vengeance against the other spouse, but not his long-term ones with
respect to ongoing relationships with children, the former spouse, and
other family members. Although the client may not be happy to receive
this message from the lawyer, it is important for the lawyer to deliver it
if she is to fulfill her ethical duty as counselor to the client. I am by no
means suggesting that the lawyer step into the role of mental health
counselor to the client. I am suggesting, however, that the attorney is
well within the bounds of her fiduciary relationship with the client to
discuss emotionally charged issues and to explore with the client the
need to find appropriate ways to resolve them so that the client can move
forward. 42

40

See Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness, supra note 22, at 481 & n.188

(citing studies).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmts. 2 & 5 (stressing that a
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lawyer may refer to moral and ethical considerations in giving advice to a client
and may offer unsolicited advice if a client's proposed course of action is likely
to result in adverse consequences); see also Leary, supra note 13 (manuscript at
6-7) (discussing the obligation to forewarn client of risk of egoic overreaction).
42 While the lawyer should not serve in the role of mental health professional for
the client, it is well within the scope of the lawyer's role to recommend that the
client consult with mental health experts or other professionals when needed.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 4 ("Family matters can involve
problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology
or social work... Where consultation with a professional in another field is
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Helping a client take the long view is particularly important since, as
Professor Fincham stresses, forgiveness is a process, sometimes a very
lengthy one. 43 In the context of divorce, for a client to expect to have
achieved forgiveness by the time the divorce is final is often unrealistic.
What is realistic is for the client to understand that finding ways to start
down that path during the legal proceedings will have long-term benefits
by allowing him to look to the future rather than the past.
Thus, from the perspective of the law, while forgiveness is not
inimical to justice, it may be irrelevant to achieving justice in the family
law setting. That does not mean, however, that a spouse's sense of
whether the system has been just is irrelevant to his ability to forgive. It
is the lawyer's job to help the client understand the goals and limits of
the legal system, so that once the legal process has run its course, the
client is free to forgive the former spouse and move forward in the new,
reconfigured relationships created by divorce.

itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make
such a recommendation.").
43 Fincham, supra note 2 (manuscript at 21).

